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This paper demonstrates the quantization of a spatial Cournot duopoly model with product choice,
a two stage game focusing on non-cooperation in locations and quantities. With quantization, the
players can access a continuous set of strategies, using continuous variable quantum mechanical
approach. The presence of quantum entanglement in the initial state identifies a quantity equilibrium
for every location pair choice with any transport cost. Also higher profit is obtained by the firms at
Nash equilibrium. Adoption of quantum strategies rewards us by the existence of a larger quantum
strategic space at equilibrium.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.65.Ud,02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum entanglement, a physical resource, plays a vital role in quantum information theory: when used as a
resource it performs various tasks which seem rather impossible for classical resources. In this regard quantum game
theory is no exception, where the concept of quantum entanglement has been used for the benefit of quantum game
over a classical one. Quantum game theory was first introduced by Meyer [1], who showed that a player can always
beat his classical opponent by adopting quantum strategies. Since then there has been a great deal of theoretical
efforts to extend the classical game theory into the quantum domain which established the fact that quantum games
are more efficient than it’s classical counterpart at least in terms of information transfer [2–5]. Recently, successful
accomplishment of the experimental realization of quantum games [6–8] on NMR quantum computer has increased
the attention on this topic.
In the literature of quantum games, one may note that the mostly studied quantum games focus on games in which
the players have finite number of strategies. But in the economics of real life, there are games in which the players can
access to a continuous set of strategies [9], a classic example of which is the Cournot’s duoploy, a game which describes
market competition. The intimate connection between the game theory and the theory of quantum communication
motivated Li et al [4] to analyse the quantization of Cournat’s dupoly using continuous variable quantum system.
Extending this idea we have studied the quantum equilibrium for the Hotelling-Smithies model of product choice,
which is a spatial Cournot duopoly with transport cost and price indiscrimination [10, 11]. Quantization of the game
shows that in equilibrium, the gain in the quantum domain is more, when the transportation cost is low. For higher
transport costs, the difference between the quantum and classical profit is negligible. We have also shown that if the
consumers are supplied with a traveling allowance to reach the seller, the optimal quantum strategic space becomes
larger than the classical optimum strategic space.
In Section II we recapitulate the classical model of Hotelling-Smithies with product choice. Section III is devoted
to the study the quantum version of the classical game and also deals with the benefit of the quantum game over the
classical one. In Section IV we treat the game with travelling allowance instead of transport cost. We end with a
conclusion.
II. CLASSICAL MODEL OF HOTELLING-SMITHIES WITH PRODUCT CHOICE
Hotelling [10] was the first to suggest that the competition between oligopolistic sellers result in consumers
being offered products with an excessive sameness, where individual demand is perfectly inelastic. His analysis
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2was extended by Smithies [11] to a case in which demand is inelastic and firms compete in quantities. It has been
recognised that Cournot competition, which is quantity setting game, gives rise to different equilibria than the
Betrand model of competition which is price setting game. We investigate the Hotelling-Smithies model of product
choice and study the Cournot equilibria for spatial duopolists which are not able to price discriminate between
their consumers. The inability to price discriminate may arise for two different situations: if consumers travel
to the seller to collect the goods, or if the seller is unable to customize the product to the individual consumer’s desires.
Let us first describe our model where two firms indexed 1 and 2, are assumed to choose locations on a linear market
normalized to unit length. Their locations, as measured by their distances from the left side market boundary, are
denoted by r1 and r2 respectively. From the symmetry we can assume 0 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤ 1. According to the strategy
of this two-stage game, these two firms can sell a product that is homogeneous in all characteristics other than the
location at which it is available. Production cost is normalized to zero for both of them and the firms are able and
willing to supply the entire market. They also simultaneously decide that the firm i(i=1,2) will produce the product
of quantity qi and sell them with price pi (per unit of product). We also consider that the consumers are distributed
uniformly with unit density over the entire linear market. Consumer inverse demand function is linear and is given
by q(s)=1-p(s), where p is the price, q is the supply and s denote the location of the consumer. Inverse demand
function and the positivity of q(s) and p(s) demand that q(s), p(s) ≤ 1. If t(assumed linear in distance and quantity
transported) is the transportation cost per unit length then the consumer need to pay the price pi + t|s− ri| for per
unit product, if he want to purchase the good from the i-th firm. It is very natural that every consumer intends to
purchase the good with lower price.
To solve the competitive game in the market we confine our attention to a two stage game [11, 12]. The firms first
choose locations and then quantities where the second stage identifies the optimal quantity for any pair of locations of
the firms. In the first stage the equilibrium locations are derived in the belief that the second stage choices will be an
equilibrium quantity pair for the second stage subgame. A pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equlibrium for the two-
stage quantity location Cournot game is defined as a pair of locations (rc1, r
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2(r1, r2)), r1, r2) ≥ Π2(qc1(r1, r2), qc2(r1, r2)), r1, r2 ∀ q2 ≥ 0 and r2 ∈ [0, 1] (4)
The quantity subgame (1) and (2) can be solved for two different cases: perfect agglomeration where r1 = r2, which
is a symmetric case and a general case where there is no perfect agglomeration. In our model, we consider the case of
non agglomeration and also choose r1 < r2 with r1 ≤ 0.5 and r2 ≥ 0.5. The firms are not agglomerated, the products
are perceived by consumers as being differentiated by location. We do not consider the market overlap, given the
outputs qi of the two firms, the market clearing condition will determine the mill prices pi (i=1,2). If r is the market
boundary[17] between two firms then,
p1 + t|r − r1| = p2 + t|r − r2|
or, r =
p2 − p1
2t
+
r1 + r2
2
(5)
The quantity dq1 sold to consumers in the interval ds located at s(0 ≤ s ≤ r) is dq1 = (1 − p1 − t|s− r1|)ds and the
quantity dq2 sold to consumers in the interval ds located at s(r ≤ s ≤ 1) is dq2 = (1 − p2 − t|s− r2|)ds from which
the aggregate quantity sold by each firm is given by
3q1 =
∫ r
0
dq1
= (1− p1 + tr1)r − t(r)
2
2
− tr21 (6)
q2 =
∫ 1
r
dq2
= (1− p2 + t(1− r2))(1 − r)− t(1− r)
2
2
− t(1− r2)2 (7)
The profit of the firm i is given by
ΠCi = piqi (i = 1, 2) (8)
and the Cournot reaction functions are
CR1 :
∂ΠC1
∂q1
= p1 + q1
∂p1
∂q1
= 0
⇒ 2tDp1 − [1− p2 + (1 − r2) + (1− r)][(1 − p1 + tr1)r − t(r)
2
2
− tr21 ] = 0 (9)
CR2 :
∂ΠC2
∂q2
= p2 + q2
∂p2
∂q2
= 0
⇒ 2tDp2 − [1− p1 + tr1 + tr][(1 − p2 + t(1 − r2))(1 − r) − t(1− r)
2
2
− t(1− r2)2] = 0 (10)
Here, D = ∂F
∂p1
∂G
∂p2
− ∂F
∂p2
∂G
∂p1
and the demand functions can be written as the implicit functions,
F (q1, q2, p1, p2) = 0 (11)
G(q1, q2, p1, p2) = 0 (12)
The solutions of the reaction functions give us the price pi(i = 1, 2) as functions of the location pair (r1, r2) and
the solutions put into equations (6) and (7) give the Nash equilibrium outputs qCi (r1, r2) for the quantity subgame.
The analytical solutions for the reaction curves are difficult for its complicated nonlinear nature. Equilibrium points
for different sets of location points r1 and r2 of the game can be solved numerically for various transport costs. The
detailed results are found in [12]. Computational results indicate that for any location pair (r1, r2) an increase in the
transport rate t increase the mill prices, but reduces the quantity produced by each firm and also reduce profits. In
the classical game when the duopolists are perfectly agglomerated i.e. when r1 = r2 = r, then the output, price and
profit will be greater the nearer are the firms located to the market centre. This is a special case of the standard
Cournot model. We can summarize the result [12] for the classical quantity equilibrium game as:
For any location pair (r1, r2) if firm i is located nearer the market centre than firm k, then
• firm i produces a greater output than firm k:
qc1(r1, r2) R qc2(r1, r2) if r1 R 1− r2;
• firm i will charge a higher mill price than firm k:
pc1(r1, r2) R pc2(r1, r2) if r1 R 1− r2; and
• firm i will earn greater profit than firm k:
Πc1(r1, r2) R Πc2(r1, r2) if r1 R 1− r2
But, the above analysis does not indicate that a firm will always wish to locate nearer to the market centre than
its rival for greater profit. Numerical results show that this will be the case, if t < tg ∼= 0.5104 for any location pair
(r1, r2) with r1 ≤ 0.5 ≤ r2. When both the firms are located very close to the market centre i.e., r1, r2 → 0.5 then,
qci (r1, r2) and p
c
i(r1, r2) are,
4lim
r1,r2→0.5
qci (r1, r2) =
8− 13t+√97t2 + 80t+ 64
48
(13)
lim
r1,r2→0.5
pci (r1, r2) =
16 + 7t−√97t2 + 80t+ 64
24
(14)
In the later part of our analysis it is shown that the result (Tables III and table IV) for the classical game with
transport cost t = 0.2 and t = 0.6, can be reproduced when the quantization parameter is turned out to be zero.
III. QUANTUM VERSION OF THE COURNOT COMPETITION
We now try to explore the above discussed classical game in quantum domain by adopting the methodology described
in [2, 4, 16]. We utilize a continuous set of eigenstates of two single-mode electromagnetic fields which are initially in
the vacuum state as
|ψ0〉 = | 0〉1 ⊗ | 0〉2, (15)
where | 0〉i(i = 1, 2) is the single-mode vacuum state associated with the i-th electromagnetic field. This state
consequently undergoes a unitary entanglement operation Jˆ(γ) = exp{−γ(aˆ1†aˆ2† − aˆ1aˆ2)}, where aˆi†(aˆi) is the
creation (annihilation) operator of the i’th mode electromagnetic field. Jˆ(γ) is known to both firms and symmetric
with respect to the interchange of the two electromagnetic fields. Hence, the resultant state is given by
|ψi〉 = Jˆ(γ)| 0〉1 ⊗ | 0〉2 (16)
The squeezing parameter γ ≥ 0 is known as entanglement parameter and in the infinite squeezing limit γ → ∞, the
initial state approximates the bipartite maximally entangled state [13–15]. The strategic moves of firm 1 and firm 2
are represented by the displacement operators Dˆ1(x1) and Dˆ2(x2) locally acted on their individual fields. The players
are restricted to choose their strategies from the sets
Sj = {Dˆj(xj) = exp(−ixj i(aˆj
† − aˆj)√
2
|xj ∈ [0,∞)},
where, j = 1, 2. After execution of their moves, firm 1 and firm 2 forward their electromagnetic fields to the final
measurement, prior to which a disentanglement operation Jˆ(γ)† is carried out. Therefore the final state prior to the
measurement is
|ψf 〉 = Jˆ(γ)†(Dˆ1(x1)⊗ Dˆ2(x2))Jˆ(γ)| 0〉1 ⊗ | 0〉2. (17)
One can set the final measurement such that it corresponds to the observables
Xˆ1 =
(aˆ1
† + aˆ1)√
2
Xˆ2 =
(aˆ2
† + aˆ2)√
2
.
This measurement is usually done by the homodyne measurement with assuming the state is infinitely squeezed.
The quantum game turns back to the original classical game when the quantum entanglement is not present i.e.,
γ = 0. For, γ = 0 the final measurement gives the original classical results q1 = 〈ψf |Xˆ1|ψf 〉 = x1 and q2 =
〈ψf |Xˆ1|ψf 〉 = x2.
On the other hand, for non-vanishing γ, the final measurement gives the respective quantities of the two firms
q1 = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ
q2 = x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ
Referring to Eq.(8), we obtain the quantum profits for the firms 1 and 2 as
ΠQ1 (x1, x2, p1, p2) = (x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ)p1 (18)
and
ΠQ2 (x1, x2, p1, p2) = (x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ)p2 (19)
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The quantity reaction curve for γ = 5, r1 = 0.45, r2 = 0.75, t = 0.2
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The quantity reaction curve for γ = 0, r1 = 0.45, r2 = 0.75, t = 0.2
Using the profit functions the Cournot reaction functions can be derived as
CRi :
∂Πi
∂qi
= pi + qi
∂pi
∂qi
= 0 (20)
Explicitly, the Cournot reaction functions for the two firms are respectively given by,
CRQ1 :
− p1 cosh γ[(1− p1 + tr1)(1 − r) + (1 − p2 + t(1− r2))r]
+(x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ)[cosh γ(1− p2
+t(1− r2) + t(1− r)) + sinh γ(1− p1 + tr1 − tr)] = 0 (21)
CRQ2 :
− p2 cosh γ[(1− p1 + tr1)(1 − r) + (1 − p2 + t(1− r2))r]
+(x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ)[cosh γ(1− p1 + tr1) + tr)
+ sinh γ(1− p2 + t(1− r2)− t(1− r))] = 0 (22)
These quantum reaction functions can be solved for price pi(i = 1, 2) as functions of the location pair (r1, r2) and
the solutions put into equations (6) and (7) give the Nash equilibrium outputs qQi (r1, r2) for the quantity subgame.
6TABLE I: Quantum solutions of the game for t=0.2, γ = 5. Data in sub-tables are for firm 1. Transposing these sub-tables
gives the corresponding data for firm 2. For example, for the location pair (ri1, r
j
2
) if the output of firm 1 is qij , then output of
firm 2 is qji.
 
a)  Quantum    
     Output 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.237504 0.234618 0.230802 0.226089 0.220522 0.214147 
0.1 0.244401 0.241504 0.237668 0.232925 0.227318 0.220891 
0.2 0.250248 0.247351 0.243505 0.238743 0.233105 0.226635 
0.3 0.255008 0.252118 0.248274 0.243505 0.237848 0.231348 
0.4 0.258634 0.255762 0.25193 0.247166 0.241505 0.234986 
0.5 0.261082 0.258238 0.25443 0.249683 0.244028 0.237505 
 
b)  Quantum    
      Price 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.474991 0.471224 0.466173 0.45982 0.452138 0.443091 
0.1 0.486786 0.482991 0.477901 0.471501 0.463768 0.454668 
0.2 0.495987 0.492145 0.486991 0.480513 0.472693 0.463501 
0.3 0.502719 0.498815 0.493574 0.486991 0.479051 0.469731 
0.4 0.507115 0.503136 0.497791 0.491078 0.482991 0.473511 
0.5 0.509304 0.50524 0.499776 0.492915 0.484657 0.474991 
 
c)  Quantum    
     Profit 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.112812 0.110558 0.107593 0.10396 0.0997066 0.0948867 
0.1 0.118971 0.116644 0.113582 0.109824 0.105423 0.100432 
0.2 0.12412 0.121732 0.118584 0.114719 0.110187 0.105046 
0.3 0.128197 0.12576 0.122542 0.118584 0.113942 0.108671 
0.4 0.131157 0.128683 0.125409 0.121378 0.116644 0.111268 
0.5 0.13297 0.130472 0.127158 0.123072 0.11827 0.112812 
TABLE II: Quantum solutions of the game for t=0.6, γ = 5.
 
a)  Quantum    
     Output 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.212502 0.205745 0.197091 0.186862 0.175339 0.162741 
0.1 0.231507 0.224503 0.215459 0.204718 0.192579 0.179278 
0.2 0.246891 0.239784 0.230503 0.219394 0.20677 0.192874 
0.3 0.258283 0.25121 0.241836 0.230503 0.217525 0.20315 
0.4 0.265372 0.258454 0.249125 0.237706 0.224503 0.209766 
0.5 0.267976 0.261324 0.252166 0.240789 0.227486 0.212503 
 
b)  Quantum    
      Price 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.424995 0.423252 0.420124 0.415031 0.407313 0.396224 
0.1 0.451105 0.448995 0.445433 0.439885 0.431737 0.420292 
0.2 0.46822 0.465414 0.460994 0.454496 0.445374 0.433003 
0.3 0.478077 0.474356 0.468786 0.460994 0.450523 0.436827 
0.4 0.482031 0.477265 0.470359 0.461055 0.448994 0.433718 
0.5 0.480959 0.475088 0.466744 0.4558 0.442006 0.424994 
 
c)  Quantum    
     Profit 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.0903125 0.0870819 0.0828026 0.0775533 0.0714179 0.0644816 
0.1 0.104434 0.1008 0.0959727 0.0900523 0.0831435 0.0753493 
0.2 0.1156 0.111599 0.10626 0.0997137 0.0920898 0.0835149 
0.3 0.123479 0.119163 0.113369 0.10626 0.0979998 0.0887413 
0.4 0.127917 0.123351 0.117178 0.109596 0.1008 0.0909795 
0.5 0.128885 0.124152 0.117697 0.109752 0.10055 0.0903125 
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium point for the Firm 1 and Firm 2 in the quantum game for the entanglement operator
γ = 5. As expected the classical game is found to be a subset of this quantum structure and our result for γ = 0,
shown in Fig. 2, reproduces the classical result given in [12]. Tables I & II provide more detailed information on the
quantum equilibria of this quantity game. For every table including Tables I & II, the data given in the sub-tables
are for firm 1. Transposing these sub-tables gives the corresponding data for firm 2. For example, for the location
pair (ri1, r
j
2) if the output of firm 1 is qij , then output of firm 2 is qji.
Tables III & IV show that setting γ = 0, in our theory we can reproduce the classical game results given in [12].
A careful examinations indicate that for any location pair (r1, r2), an increase in the transport rate t increase
the mill prices, but reduces the quantity produced by each firm and also reduce profits. The results also provide a
benchmark against which we can assess the actual locations the firms choose in the location stage of the quantity
location game. Independent of the transport rate, when the firms are located symmetrically (i.e. r2 = 1 − r1),
7TABLE III: Classical(i.e. γ = 0) solutions of the game for t=0.2.
 
a)  Classical   
     Output 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.301277 0.295516 0.288621 0.280649 0.271663 0.261726 
0.1 0.312489 0.306682 0.299722 0.291666 0.282577 0.27252 
0.2 0.322464 0.316621 0.309605 0.301475 0.292291 0.28212 
0.3 0.331151 0.325283 0.318225 0.31003 0.300762 0.290486 
0.4 0.338491 0.332611 0.325521 0.317276 0.307937 0.297567 
0.5 0.344418 0.338539 0.331432 0.323151 0.313753 0.303304 
 
b)  Classical   
      Price 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.347446 0.342911 0.337366 0.330792 0.323168 0.314468 
0.1 0.357161 0.352636 0.347101 0.340537 0.332926 0.324243 
0.2 0.364855 0.360329 0.354789 0.34822 0.340604 0.33192 
0.3 0.370624 0.366086 0.360529 0.35394 0.346302 0.337598 
0.4 0.374569 0.370011 0.364426 0.357802 0.350127 0.341385 
0.5 0.376791 0.372205 0.366581 0.359911 0.352186 0.343392 
 
c)  Classical   
     Profit 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.104677 0.101336 0.097371 0.0928366 0.0877927 0.0823046 
0.1 0.111609 0.108147 0.104034 0.0993231 0.0940772 0.0883628 
0.2 0.117653 0.114088 0.109845 0.10498 0.0995555 0.0936411 
0.3 0.122732 0.119082 0.114729 0.109732 0.104155 0.0980674 
0.4 0.126788 0.12307 0.118628 0.113522 0.107817 0.101585 
0.5 0.129774 0.126006 0.121497 0.116306 0.110499 0.104152 
TABLE IV: Classical(i.e. γ = 0) solutions of the game for t=0.6.
 
a)  Classical   
     Output 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.24505 0.235763 0.22438 0.21125 0.196678 0.180899 
0.1 0.270994 0.26117 0.249078 0.235106 0.21959 0.202788 
0.2 0.293715 0.283442 0.270722 0.255974 0.23956 0.22176 
0.3 0.312703 0.302075 0.288812 0.273364 0.256117 0.237366 
0.4 0.327433 0.316548 0.302839 0.286778 0.268775 0.249142 
0.5 0.337446 0.326409 0.312361 0.295789 0.277121 0.256689 
 
b)  Classical   
      Price 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.3599 0.356504 0.351274 0.343705 0.333266 0.319413 
0.1 0.379145 0.375661 0.370364 0.362788 0.352442 0.338818 
0.2 0.390036 0.386219 0.380556 0.372634 0.362018 0.348255 
0.3 0.394337 0.390021 0.383783 0.375273 0.364119 0.349928 
0.4 0.393455 0.388538 0.381588 0.372327 0.36045 0.345626 
0.5 0.388378 0.382805 0.375061 0.364946 0.352223 0.336623 
 
c)  Classical   
     Profit 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.0881935 0.0840506 0.0788188 0.0726076 0.0655463 0.0577815 
0.1 0.102746 0.0981112 0.0922496 0.0852938 0.0773929 0.0687085 
0.2 0.114559 0.109471 0.103025 0.0953846 0.0867252 0.0772289 
0.3 0.12331 0.117816 0.110841 0.102586 0.0932568 0.0830612 
0.4 0.12883 0.122991 0.11556 0.106775 0.0968799 0.08611 
0.5 0.131057 0.124951 0.117154 0.107947 0.0976087 0.0864072 
the individual firm profit is maximised when the firms are located inside but near the quartiles. The aggregate
output is maximized when the firms are located symmetrically. But surprisingly, the symmetric location pair that
maximises aggregate output is more agglomerated when the transport rate is higher. Low transport costs encourage
agglomeration and quantity competition. Higher transport costs imply that sales decline relatively quickly with
distance from the firm and so give heavier weight to consumers close to the firm. This moderates somewhat the
competitive pressures of proximate locations.
Another intriguing result is expressed in Fig. 3. Figure 3 needs some explanation. It is noted that the quantum
benefit of the profit of the firm 2, Γ2 = Π
Q
2 −ΠC2 is greater than Γ1 = ΠQ2 −ΠC2 (quantum benefit of the profit of the
firm 1) for higher transport cost, whereas it decreases for lower t and finally the difference Γ2 − Γ1 = 0 for t = 0 and
γ = 0. Γ2 ≥ Γ1, due to the fact that the location r2 = 0.6 of the firm 2 is towards more central than the location
r1 = 0.3 of the firm 1. So there is a strong quantum advantage for firm i if the location of the i-th firm is more central.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The quantum benefit Γi = Π
Q
i −ΠCi at equilibrium point over the classical equilibrium as a function of
the transportation cost ‘t’ and the entanglement parameter ‘γ’. We have selected the location of the firm 1 r1 = 0.3 and the
location of the firm 2 r2 = 0.6. Blue plot: Profit for firm 1 w.r.t. transportation cost ‘t’ and ‘γ’. Red plot: Profit for firm 2
w.r.t. transportation cost ‘t’ and ‘γ’.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Quantum profit at Nash equilibrium w.r.t. the entanglement parameter γ for t=0.2, r1 = 0.3 and
r2 = 0.6. Blue line: Quantum profit (Π
Q
1
) of the firm 1 w.r.t. γ. Red line: Quantum profit(ΠQ
2
) of the firm 2 w.r.t. γ. Here
ΠCi denoted the classical profit of the i-th firm.
The plot of the profits for both the firms with the entanglement parameter γ, for a fixed transport cost and a set
of a fixed location parameters given in Figure 4 explains vividly the quantum benefit over its classical counterpart.
Next, one can analyse the quantum benefit Γi = Π
Q
i − ΠCi for a fixed γ (say, γ = 5) and a fixed set of
locations of the firms for different values of the transport cost t. The analysis is shown in Fig. 5. The quantum
benefit is maximum for zero transport cost for both the firms. As t is increased the benefit rapidly falls for both
the firms, but the rate of decrement is more for firm 2 than firm 1 (as we discussed earlier this is also due to
the fact that the location of firm 1 is more central also seen in the Fig. 3), and as expected when t attains
a much higher value, the quantum benefit Γi asymptotically tends to zero for both the firms, i.e. for a higher
transport cost the quantum profit over its classical counterpart is negligible. The existence of a symmetric Nash
equilibrium (i.e., profit of firm 1= profit of firm 2) for the zero consumer transportation cost is an example of
another important feature of this game. We can observe the same feature if t is independent of the distance.
The symmetric quantum Nash equilibrium is also obtained if the firms are perfectly agglomerated (r1 = r2) or
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The quantum benefit Γi = Π
Q
i − ΠCi at Nash equilibrium point over the classical Nash equilibrium as
a function of the transportation cost ‘t’. Here the entanglement parameter γ = 5, location of the firm 1 r1 = 0.3 and location
of the firm 2 x2 = 0.6. Blue line: Quantum benefit(Γ1) for firm 1 w.r.t. transportation cost ‘t’. Red line: Quantum benefit Γ2
for firm 2 w.r.t. transportation cost ‘t’.
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FIG. 6: The profits at quantum Nash equilibrium w.r.t the entanglement parameter γ, when the two firms are perfectly
agglomerated or, symmetric location(i.e. r1 = 1− r2) for t=0.2, r10.3 and r2 = 0.7. Here both the quantum (classical) profits
are same, i.e. ΠQ
1
= ΠQ
2
(ΠC1 = Π
C
2 ).
symmetrically located (r1 = 1− r2). A key feature in Li. et. al [4] is the zero transportation cost or the firms location
are perfectly agglomerated and the quantum profit gain at Nash equilibrium over classical is equivalent to the
case given in figure 6, where the locations of the firms are considered to be symmetric within the market i.e. r1 = 1−r2.
The quantization of a classical game can be termed as successful when the quantum profit is higher than the
classical profit. A critical comparison of the Tables I, II, III and IV very nicely explain the competency of our model
in this regard by showing that for different transport costs, at equilibrium points, the quantum profit is more than the
corresponding classical profit. The behaviour in outputs of the firms for the quantum version of the game is similar
to that of its classical counterpart, but with higher profit. Like classical situation, in quantum case there also exists a
transport cost tQg (γ) (
∼= 0.39353; when, γ = 5) for which, any t < tQg (γ) firm i’s profit is always greater, if the location
of the firm is nearer to the market centre. Also,
lim
r1,r2→0.5
qQi (r1, r2) = [(8− 13t) cos γ − t sin γ +
√
((64 + t(80 + 97t)) cos2 γ
+t sin γ(2(40 + t) cos γ + t sin γ))]/(16(3 cos γ + sin γ)) (23)
lim
r1,r2→0.5
pQi (r1, r2) = [(16 + 7t) cos γ + sin γ(8− t)−
√
((64 + t(80 + 97t)) cos2 γ
+t sin γ(2(40 + t) cos γ + t sin γ))]/(8(3 cos γ + sin γ)) (24)
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TABLE V: Classical(i.e., γ = 0) solutions of the game for t=-0.2.
 
a)  Classical   
     Output 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0  0.367882 0.376636 0.386645 0.397822 0.41008 0.423336 
0.1  0.353829 0.362674 0.372776 0.384038 0.396357 0.409634 
0.2  0.341181 0.350133 0.360347 0.371711 0.384107 0.397414 
0.3  0.329974 0.339064 0.349422 0.360921 0.373423 0.386787 
0.4  0.320254 0.329528 0.340079 0.351764 0.364424 0.377892 
0.5  0.312065 0.321589 0.332407 0.344353 0.357246 0.370891 
 
b)  Classical   
      Price 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0  0.314236 0.325123 0.337834 0.352354 0.36865 0.386665 
0.1  0.297812 0.308652 0.321318 0.335792 0.35204 0.369998 
0.2  0.281878 0.292678 0.305306 0.319746 0.335957 0.353873 
0.3  0.266365 0.277133 0.289738 0.304158 0.320352 0.338249 
0.4  0.25117 0.261923 0.274523 0.288948 0.305153 0.323063 
0.5  0.236156 0.246915 0.259537 0.273999 0.290252 0.308218 
 
c)  Classical   
     Profit 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0  0.115602 0.122453 0.130622 0.140174 0.151176 0.163689 
0.1  0.105374 0.11194 0.11978 0.128957 0.139534 0.151564 
0.2  0.096171 0.102476 0.110016 0.118853 0.129043 0.140634 
0.3  0.087894 0.0939659 0.101241 0.109777 0.119627 0.130831 
0.4  0.080438 0.0863108 0.0933595 0.101641 0.111205 0.122083 
0.5  0.073696 0.079405 0.086272 0.0943525 0.103691 0.114315 
IV. GAME WITH TRANSPORT ALLOWANCE
Finally, in this section we describe a fascinating situation. Let us think of the case when a consumer does not
bear the transport cost, instead the consumer earns some amount of money as transport allowance for his/her
transportation to the firm for buying any product . This situation can be explored by setting t a negative value,
where each consumer earns an amount u = −t per unit distance when they travel to the seller(Firm) to collect the
goods. We call it transport allowance and denote it as u = −t per unit distance.
Numerical computations are displayed in the Tables V & VI.
Next, we analyse the variation of the profit with the transport allowance −t = u and entanglement parameter γ.
Figures (7& 8) show the variation of the profit Πi (i=1,2) for a wide range of t, (−1.5 < t < 1) and γ. We denote
t = tc as a critical point for the profit of the firm i, Πi, when the profit is zero and after that starts to be negative (
Πi < 0). For any Πi < 0 (i = 1, 2), it is seen that for t < tc < 0, at least one optimal profit is negative. We can write
−tc = uc as the critical travel allowance.
The t-γ plane with Πi = 0 is denoted as the zero profit plane. It is noticed that for a large region of γ and −ve ‘t’,
the quantum profit is still above the ‘0’ profit plane (i.e. positive), whereas in the classical case, profit is below the
‘0’ profit plane which means profit is negative.
With this analysis, another important feature of quantum game theory can be explored. Let
SS = {(q1, q2, p1, p2)|0 ≤ qi, pi(i = 1, 2)} be the Strategic Space(SS) and OSS be the Optimal Strategic
Space(OSS)[18] of a quantity equilibrium game for fixed location. Therefore, OSS ⊂ SS.
For Πi = qipi < 0 ⇒ we should have either pi < 0 or, qi < 0, i.e., for negative profit the equilibrium strategic point
(q1, q2, p1, p2) /∈ SS(⊃ OSS).
Figures (7& 8) show that for both the firms tQc < t
C
c < 0 for a fixed location (r1&r2), here −tQc is the genuine(γ > 0)
quantum critical travel allowance uQc , and u
C
c = −tCc is the classical critical transport allowance. Therefore,
∃ t(< tCc < 0), such that both the quantum profits ΠQ1 &ΠQ2 > 0, whereas at least one classical profit (either Π1 or,
Π2) is negative, for a fixed location. So the optimal quantum strategic space(OSS
Q) is always larger than the optimal
classical strategic space (OSSC), which is another feature of importance in a quantum game.
The plots (7 & 8) and the tables (V & VI) indicate that if the present two-stage game is played, either classically
or in the quantum domain, with transport allowance instead of transportation cost then:
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TABLE VI: Quantum solutions of the game for t=-0.2, γ = 5.
 
a)  Quantum    
     Output 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0 0.262507 0.265366 0.26914 0.273794 0.279308 0.285686 
0.1 0.255641 0.258507 0.262285 0.266933 0.272417 0.278729 
0.2 0.24986 0.252731 0.256507 0.261138 0.266573 0.272783 
0.3 0.245238 0.248117 0.251895 0.256507 0.261882 0.267967 
0.4 0.241881 0.244782 0.248578 0.253185 0.258507 0.264455 
0.5 0.239932 0.242883 0.246733 0.251374 0.256677 0.262508 
 
b)  Quantum    
      Price 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0  0.524986 0.533461 0.54474 0.558746 0.575332 0.594247 
0.1  0.508461 0.516986 0.528344 0.542462 0.559197 0.578298 
0.2  0.49291 0.501508 0.512986 0.527272 0.544229 0.563607 
0.3  0.478126 0.486827 0.498468 0.512986 0.530249 0.550014 
0.4  0.463805 0.472642 0.484496 0.499316 0.516985 0.537269 
0.5  0.449514 0.458522 0.470643 0.485843 0.504028 0.524985 
 
c)  Quantum    
     Profit 
r2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
 
r1 
0  0.137812 0.141563 0.146611 0.152981 0.160695 0.169768 
0.1  0.129984 0.133644 0.138577 0.144801 0.152335 0.161188 
0.2  0.123159 0.126747 0.131584 0.137691 0.145076 0.153743 
0.3  0.117255 0.12079 0.125562 0.131584 0.138863 0.147386 
0.4  0.112186 0.115694 0.120435 0.12642 0.133644 0.142084 
0.5  0.107853 0.111367 0.116123 0.122128 0.129372 0.137812 
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Plot of quantum (blue surface) and classical (pink surface) profits with respect to γ and t for the location
r1 = 0.3 and r2 = 0.6 of firm 1 at equilibrium point. Plot shows that for a large region of γ and negative ‘t’, the quantum
profit is still above(i.e. positive) the ‘0’ profit plane (cyan surface) , whereas classical profit is negative (i.e. below the ‘0’ profit
plane).
For any location pair (r1, r2) if firm 1 is located nearer the market centre than firm 2, then
• firm i produces a greater output than firm k:
qc1(r1, r2) R qc2(r1, r2) if r1 ⋚ 1− r2;
• firm i will charge a higher mill price than firm k:
pc1(r1, r2) R pc2(r1, r2) if r1 ⋚ 1− r2; and
• firm i will earn greater profit than firm k:
Πc1(r1, r2) ⋚ Πc2(r1, r2) if r1 R 1− r2
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Plot of quantum (blue surface) and classical (pink surface) profits with respect to γ and t for the location
r1 = 0.3 and r2 = 0.6 of firm 2 at equilibrium point. Plot shows that for a large region of γ and negative ‘t’, the quantum
profit is still above(i.e. positive) the ‘0’ profit plane (cyan surface) , whereas classical profit is negative (i.e. below the ‘0’ profit
plane).
which implies that for negative ‘t’, there is a strong competitive advantage when the firm location are nearer the end
of the market boundary unlike the case when the transport cost ‘t’ is positive.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Letter, we explore some interesting cases of Hotelling-Smithies model of product choice where the player
can be benefited more by adopting a quantum strategy rather the classical strategy, leaving a large number of cases
unresolved. Specially, the quantum benefit in Bertrand competition (with transport cost indiscrimination) which
seems a more difficult problem than the case of Cournot quantity competition. We also demonstrate the fact that the
quantum equilibrium strategic space of a Cournot quantity competition game is larger than the classical equilibrium
strategic space. Although, this result as expected, is uncommon for any quantum game having only linear demand
function and hope that this result would encourage the researchers in this area to develop the field further.
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